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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ANNOTATIONS
This section contains a digest of all reported decisions interpreting pro-
visions of the Uniform Commercial Code published from the first week of
June, 1964 through the first week of September, 1964, in the National Re-
porter System.
MATTHEW T. CONNOLLY
JOHN M. MORAN
ARTICLE 2: SALES
SECTION 2-302. Unconscionable Contract or Clause
AMERICAN HOME IMPROVEMENT INC. V. MACIVER
201 A.2d 886 (1964)
The defendant, a homeowner, signed an agreement with the plaintiff for
home improvements and an application for financing. The plaintiff later
notified the defendant that credit in the net amount of $1,759 had been ap-
proved and that his monthly payments would be $42.81 for 60 months.
Relying on the agreement, the plaintiff paid a sales commission of $800. After
performing a negligible amount of work, the plaintiff was ordered by the de-
fendant to cease work on the premises. The plaintiff sued for breach of 'con-
tract. In affirming a judgment for the defendant, the court held, first, that the
plaintiff failed to comply with the disclosure act (RSA 399-B) which re-
quires under Section 399-B 2 (supp.) that "any person engaged in the business
of extending credit shall furnish . . . concurrently with the consummation of
the transactions . . . a clear statement in writing setting forth the finance
charges, expressed in dollars, rate of interest, or monthly rate of charge, or a
combination thereof. . ." and, second, that since the defendant was paying
$2,568.60 for goods and services worth $959.00 ($800 being allocable to the
sales commission, $809.60 to interest and finance charges), the contract was
unconscionable under Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
COMMENT
Though the standards of unconscionability are essentially the same under
the common law and the Code, there appears to be no case at common law in
which a contract such as the present one has been held unconscionable. In-
deed, resting the decision on the ground of unconscionability 'would seem to
be unwarranted, since the defendant received notice of the interest and
carrying charges and was not defrauded by the complexities of the trans-
action.
J.M.M.
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SECTION 2-314. Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage
of Trade
NEDEROSTEK V. ENDICOTT-JOHNSON SHOE Co.
415 Pa. 136, 202 A.2d 72 (1964)
Annotated under Section 2-318, infra.
SECTION 2-315. Implied Warranty: Fitness for
Particular Purpose
NEDEROSTEK V. ENDICOTT-JOHNSON SHOE Co.
415 Pa. 136, 202 A.2d 72 (1964)
Annotated under Section 2-318, infra.
SECTION 2-318. Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties
Express or Implied
NEDEROSTEK V. ENDICOTT-JOHNSON SHOE Co.
415 Pa. 136, 202 A.2d 72 (1964)
In this suit for breach of implied warranty of fitness, the plaintiff al-
leged that he was "supplied" a pair of safety work shoes by his employer,
that his employer had purchased the shoes from the defendant Lehigh Safety
Shoe Co., and that the shoes had been manufactured by the defendant
Endicott-Johnson Shoe Co. He further alleged that as a result of wearing the
shoes he developed extensive contact dermatitis of his feet and hands. The
low& court sustained the defendants' motions for judgment on the pleadings
on the ground that the supplying of the shoes by the employer was a fringe
benefit and not a sale.
On appeal, reversed, the court holding that the plaintiff's allegation that
the shoes were "supplied" to him by his employer was susceptible of many
interpretations and that the lower court could not hold, as a matter of fact
or law, that the plaintiff was excluded from the class of persons to whom
implied warranties extend under Sections 2-314, 2-315 and 2-318 and the
developing case law.
COMMENT
Although it is not clear whether the plaintiff was suing under Section
2-314 for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability or under Sec-
tion 2-315 for breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose, it would seem that the breach, if there were one, would come under
Section 2-314. This is because the safety shoes were unfit for the ordinary
purposes for which they were intended, that is, for ordinary wearing, and
not unfit for any particular purpose. The plaintiff did not receive any injury
or suffer any loss which the shoes were particularly designed to prevent.
M.T.C.
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SECTION 2-326. Sale on Approval and Sale or Return;
Consignment Sales and Rights of Creditors
GENERAL ELEC. CO . V. PETTINGELL SUPPLY CO.
—Mass.--, 199 N.E.2d 326 (1964)
The Pettingell Supply Co. is a wholesaler of electrical merchandise
whose only consignment business consisted of General Electric's large lamps.
Under the consignment contract Pettingell was authorized to sell the lamps
to its own customers or distribute them to other agents of General Electric.
When Pettingell's business faltered, General Electric by writ of replevin re-
possessed its lamps from Pettingell's assignee-for-the-benefit-of-creditors. The
lower court held that under Section 2-326(3), General Electric had to return
the goods to the assignee.
Upon appeal, General Electric argued that no part of Section 2-326
was applicable since the relationship between it and Pettingell was not that
of seller and buyer but that of principal and agent. The court ruled, however,
that Section 2-326(3) by its very terms concerned itself with transactions
which, though they might not be sales under Section 2-106(1), were none-
theless "deemed to be on sale or return . . . with respect to claims of
creditors. . ."
General Electric also contended that Section 2-326 did not apply be-
cause the defendant, as the plaintiff's agent, had not been sold the lamps
and therefore could not resell them as sentence two of Section 2-326(3)
contemplated. In dismissing this contention, the court found that the second
sentence exemplified but did not limit the plain meaning of the first sentence
which made subsection 3 applicable to transactions not ordinarily character-
ized as sales.
The plaintiff further argued that, since Pettingell sold only one brand
of large lamps, it did not deal "in goods of the kind involved." However, the
court found that the quoted phrase in Section 2-326(3) does not restrict
the relevant business to dealings in the precise kind of goods. The fact that
Pettingell sold other electrical items was sufficient.
The court also found that Pettingell was doing business under a name
different from that of General Electric, despite the fact that the forms it
used in selling the large lamps stated Pettingell was "agent for General
Electric, consignor company!'
The court further found that, since Pettingell was authorized to sell
the lamps to its own customers, the lamps were "delivered . .. for sale"
within the meaning of Section 2-326(3). It was irrelevant that 76% of the
lamps were actually distributed, not sold, to General Electric's other agents.
Judgment for the assignee was affirmed.
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